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COMPETITION POLICY TOWARD DOMINANT 
UTILITY COMPANIES: VERTICAL DIVESTITURE 
OR ACCESS RULES? 
TOSHIAKI TAKIGAWA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This Article compares different methods of introducing competition into 
monopolistic utilities. Regulatory reform introducing competition into 
utilities thus far has taken place primarily in developed countries. However, a 
few developing countries like Chile have initiated innovative regulatory 
reforms in the telecommunications and electricity sectors. Developing 
countries have the potential to leapfrog developed countries in terms of their 
regulatory reform because they can learn from pioneering countries’ past 
mistakes. Efficient operation of utilities like the telecommunications and 
electricity utilities is vitally important for developing countries to achieve 
swift economic growth, as such utilities form the infrastructure for all 
industries.  
Important utilities like the electric and telecommunications utilities have 
remained monopolies in most countries. Many economists previously 
rationalized these monopolies to be natural, but they have shown that 
because the elements of these utilities1 are potentially competitive, only some 
elements form natural monopolies.2 Technological progress continues to 
broaden the competitive elements in utilities. 
Although many utilities are potentially competitive, monopolists can 
easily exclude new entrants from potentially competitive fields by offering 
  Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, Kansai University, Osaka, Japan. A version of this Article 
was presented at the APEC Competition Policy and Economic Development Project, University of 
Victoria, Canada: Centre for Asia-Pacific Initiative. 
 1. For instance, both electricity generation and long-distance telecommunications are 
potentially competitive elements. 
 2. Robert Crandall and Jerry Hausman describe how competition in long-distance markets has 
expanded in U.S. telecommunications service. See Robert W. Crandall & Jerry A. Hausman, 
Competition in U.S. Telecommunications Services: Effects of the 1996 Legislation, in DEREGULATION 
OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES: WHAT’S NEXT? 100-02 (Sam Peltzman & Clifford Winston eds., 2000). 
Paul Joskow describes how competition in the U.S. electric power industry has expanded from being a 
wholesale power generation market to a retail market. See Paul L. Joskow, Deregulation and 
Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electric Power Sector, in DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES: 
WHAT’S NEXT?, supra, at 124-82. 
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utility services to consumers in a vertically integrated format.3 This allows 
vertically integrated monopolists to block new entrants by denying them 
access to the monopolists’ facilities that tend to form bottlenecks to 
competition. 
Regulatory agencies may prohibit utility companies from denying access 
to such facilities, but such prohibitions often are ineffective in their attempts 
to reassure new competitors in the respective markets. Vertically integrated 
monopolists can treat new entrants unfavorably and rationalize that treatment 
with technical or other business reasons. This unfavorable treatment works in 
favor of the vertically integrated monopolists because regulators find it 
difficult to identify illegalities in such discriminating behavior. In order to 
effectively combat vertically integrated utilities, regulatory agencies should 
take measures to separate the naturally monopolistic elements of such 
utilities from the potentially competitive elements. Doing so would eliminate 
any incentive separated natural monopolists might have to discriminate 
between new competitors and incumbents. 
Incumbent monopolists and commentators oppose the idea of vertical 
separation. First, they argue that vertical separation disrupts economies of 
coordination or “economies of scope.” Second, they contend that well crafted 
access regulations can regulate the discriminatory conduct of integrated 
monopolists effectively, thereby reassuring potentially competitive utility 
elements. 
This Article evaluates the comparative benefits of these two approaches 
to introducing competition into monopolistic utilities—(1) vertical separation 
(divestiture), and (2) access regulation without vertical separation—using 
two of the most important utilities (electricity and telecommunications) as 
examples. This Article compares the experiences in the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Japan to assist developing countries in eliciting lessons 
to apply to their own regulatory reform. 
Part II explains why deregulation and pro-competitive regulatory reform 
should replace traditional utility regulations. Part III examines the electricity 
and telecommunications sectors to explore options for vertically separating 
utilities, and then comparatively assesses and evaluates the merits of vertical 
separations and access rules governing integrated monopolists. Part IV 
examines methods for coping with utility reintegration. Part V concludes 
with several lessons regarding the comparative benefits of vertical separation 
and access rules. 
 3. For instance, electricity generation should be coupled with electricity transportation, and 
long-distance telecommunications service should be provided to consumers through a local loop. 
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II. DEREGULATION AND REGULATORY REFORM OF UTILITIES 
A. The Advantage of Competition Over Regulation 
All countries regulate utilities heavily. Governments regard such 
regulation as necessary to protect the interests of private citizens. First, 
governments view utility services such as electricity and telecommunications 
as being fundamentally necessary for citizens’ daily lives, and regulation 
therefore is justified because it obligates utility companies to provide these 
important services to every citizen. Second, utility rate setting necessitates 
governmental control, as many utilities, due to a natural monopoly, can 
support only one provider per sector. Without governmental regulations, 
monopolists would be free to charge any amount for services they desired. 
Regulated utilities are inefficient, running up increasingly high costs and 
charging exorbitant rates. Traditional utility regulation consists of cost-of-
service rate controls in exchange for monopoly franchise grants. This system 
contains no incentives for utilities to improve their efficiency, a fact that 
economists were the first to notice and announce. Ordinary citizens usually 
do not realize the benefits of competition, as they are used to long-term 
utility monopolies. Furthermore, utilities employ a great number of people. 
These employees, through their unions, constitute strong interest groups that 
generally oppose regulatory reform. 
From their roots in a small number of developed countries, deregulation 
and the regulatory reform of utilities have spread to many other countries, 
including some developing countries.4 This trend originated in the United 
States, which demonstrated to other countries that deregulation and pro-
competitive regulatory reform can produce enormous economic benefits.5 
These benefits subsequently turned out to be much larger than economists 
predicted. The liberation of economic activities, combined with enhanced 
competitive pressure, gave rise to unforeseen changes in business methods 
and industry structure.6 Following deregulation, real operating costs of 
 4. Robert Hahn compiled regulations (the nature of state ownership and level of competition) 
regarding service industries (including airlines, urban transport, and telecommunications) in nine 
developing countries (including Chile, Korea, and Mexico) and reports that in all nine countries, the 
degree of regulation has decreased. Chile has achieved the largest reduction in regulations.  ROBERT 
W. HAHN, REVIVING REGULATORY REFORM: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 17-19 (2000). 
 5. The U.S. airline industry achieved the most notable benefit of deregulation, for deregulation 
has brought passengers roughly 27% lower fares since 1994. Steven A. Morrison and Clifford 
Winston, The Remaining Role for Government Policy in the Deregulated Airline Industry, in 
DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES: WHAT’S NEXT?, supra note 2, at 1. 
 6. The most notable example of these changes is the hub-and-spoke-structure of airline routes 
and services in the United States. 
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deregulated industries in the United States fell roughly 25%-75%.7 
The preceding example demonstrates that the benefit of competition lies 
more in its effect on dynamic efficiency than its effect on allocative 
efficiency. Competition produces dynamic efficiency by forcing companies 
to reduce costs and innovate. Competition inspires much more dynamic 
efficiency than generally is anticipated, as economists cannot predict how 
business will innovate under the pressure of competition. 
New Zealand represents another good example of the benefits of 
deregulation and pro-competitive regulatory reform. In the mid-1980s, New 
Zealand adopted government-wide pro-competitive regulatory reforms to get 
out of a long-lasting economic slump. The Commerce Act, passed in 1986, 
codified the basic principle that competitive principles would govern 
economic activity.8 
Studies on regulatory reform performed by the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) compile the experience of 
regulatory reforms in OECD countries.9 The OECD’s synthesis generally 
supports the experience and methods of the United States and New Zealand. 
General lessons of this synthesis may be summarized as follows: 
 Technological progress has made many utilities competitive. For 
those competitive elements, industry-specific government 
regulations distort competition and therefore should be abolished. 
 For utilities in functioning competitive markets, the general rule of 
law should replace industry regulations. In particular, antitrust law 
should be applied to competitive utilities without exception. 
 If preferential treatment for certain segments of the population 
(e.g., people living in remote areas) is deemed politically 
necessary, the government should directly and explicitly support 
them. Utility companies should avoid competition distorting cross-
subsidization. 
 7. Clifford Winston, U.S. Industry Adjustment to Economic Deregulation, J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES, Summer 1998, at 89, 107 (1998). 
 8. Maurice P. McTigue, Alternative to Regulation: A Study of Reform in New Zealand, 
REGULATION, Winter 1998, at 34-40.  
 9. See generally OECD, THE OECD REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM, VOLUME I: SECTORAL 
STUDIES (1997).  
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B. Monopoly Problems of Network Utilities 
Rapid technological progress has widened competitive elements in 
utilities. Cores of utilities, however, remain natural monopolies due to 
economies of scale and vertically integrated networks. The electricity and 
telecommunications sectors best represent such natural monopolies. In the 
electricity sector, a high-voltage grid network forms a natural monopoly, and 
in the telecommunications sector, local loop networks remain natural 
monopolies. Cable television and wireless technologies like cellular and 
satellite communications together have made inroads into local 
telecommunications. However, the network effect of telecommunications 
works against small-scale entries, thus allowing monopoly positions of local 
incumbents to persist. 
Large portions of the electricity and telecommunications sectors are not 
naturally monopolistic. Thus, new entries remain economically and 
technologically viable. Within the telecommunications industry, the long-
distance communications sector is ripe for competition; within the electricity 
sector, electricity generation and retailing are ripe as well. However, if 
incumbent monopolists remain vertically integrated, entire elements of 
utilities likely will remain monopolies because incumbent monopolists 
naturally do not embrace new entrants. Vertically integrated monopolists can 
obstruct new entrants easily by denying them access to the incumbents’ 
natural monopoly elements, thus creating bottlenecks to competition. 
The experiences of recently deregulated industries demonstrate that 
regulation can be very costly and that complicated regulatory oversight rarely 
succeeds. The airline industry in the United States serves as the typical 
example. Hence, the general rule for regulatory reform of utilities containing 
a bottleneck element is to separate the bottleneck element from the 
competitive element. Regulatory agencies then can regulate the bottleneck 
element and leave the competitive element to both competition law and the 
general rule of law.10 
III. DIVESTITURE OF BOTTLENECK ELEMENTS AND ACCESS REGULATIONS 
Many countries already have successfully divested bottlenecks in the 
electricity and telecommunications sectors. However, divestiture is not 
necessarily the preferred solution due to fundamental differences between 
 10. Australia amended its competition law to properly apply it to “network infrastructure 
industries.” Id. at 225. 
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major countries. In addition, marked differences exist between the electricity 
and telecommunications sectors.  
A. The Electricity Sector: A Global Trend Toward Vertical Separation 
The electricity industry is beginning to accept the merits of vertical 
separation. Nevertheless, two primary issues remain. First, how can 
governments legally divest investor-owned utilities without harming the 
interests of stockholders? Second, among the major developed economies, 
why is Japan so reluctant to adopt vertical separation? 
1. United Kingdom: Vertical Separation at the Time of Privatization 
The United Kingdom is a leading country in the vertical divestiture of 
electric companies. The success of the United Kingdom’s divestiture 
gradually has influenced other European Union member countries through 
the European Commission’s regulatory policies. 
The experience of the United Kingdom demonstrates that governments 
should vertically separate state-owned utilities at the time of privatization. 
Divestiture of state-owned companies never harms investors, as the 
government owns them in full. In contrast, the United Kingdom privatized 
British Telecom while maintaining its vertical integration, the effect being 
British Telecom ultimately could not be divested without negatively 
impacting private investors who purchased stock.  
The experience of the United Kingdom, together with similar experiences 
of Australia (specifically the state of Victoria) and New Zealand, show that 
separating the power grid from electricity generation and retailing does not 
cause a loss in an economy of scope—namely, an economy of integrated 
coordination.11 Each state realized an industry-wide adaptation of demand 
and supply through the establishment of (1) grid access rules, and (2) a 
competitive spot market for wholesale electricity.12 
A comparison of the United Kingdom and Australia (state of Victoria) 
raises questions about the merits of privatization. Both countries vertically 
separated their electricity utilities and introduced competition into electricity 
generation and retailing. The United Kingdom chose to privatize incumbent 
monopolists. However, Australia decided to maintain state ownership of 
incumbent utilities. Some scholars point out that the introduction of 
competition remains vitally important, whereas privatization does not itself 
 11. Id. at 159. 
 12. Id. at 177. 
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change utilities’ performance.13  
The Japanese experience, however, indicates that the introduction of 
competition should accompany privatization in order to improve the overall 
performance of utilities. For example, Japanese state-owned railways 
compiled an enormous amount of debt through years of competing against 
private railways and airlines. After being privatized in 1987, Japan Railway 
(JR) radically improved its performance and ever since has generated annual 
profits consistently. The JR experience exemplifies the following benefits of 
privatization: (1) state-owned companies expect that an infusion of tax 
money will wipe out any deficits while privatized companies cannot 
realistically hold such expectations; (2) privatization of utilities radically 
reduces irresponsible demands from politicians with local interests; and (3) 
privatization motivates labor unions to cooperate with management efforts to 
reduce costs and increase profits. 
2. United States: Vertical Separation of Investor-Owned Utilities 
Vertical separation of utilities in the United States offers lessons for 
countries in which private investors own the utility companies. Government-
forced divestiture of investor-owned companies runs the risk of violating 
investors’ private property rights.  
(a)  Difficulty in Securing Non-Discriminatory Grid Access  
The electricity industry in the United States generally can be divided into 
three elements: (1) generation; (2) transmission; and (3) retailing 
(distribution). The generation element is potentially competitive, thereby 
simplifying the introduction of competition. Individual state governments 
should loosen restrictions on new entries into the generation market, while 
simultaneously obligating incumbent utilities to purchase electricity from the 
new generators at competitive prices. 
A good way to make the electricity market genuinely competitive would 
be to make the retailing market competitive. To achieve this, new entrants 
into the retailing market (which in many cases will be the same new entrants 
into the generation market) should receive a measure of access to the 
incumbent utilities’ power grids. California was the first of several States to 
introduce competition into electricity retailing. Unlike the State-owned 
utilities, States simply cannot order investor-owned utilities to divest their 
 13. Cf. DAVID M. NEWBERY, PRIVATIZATION, RESTRUCTURING, AND REGULATION OF 
NETWORK UTILITIES 185-87 (1999). 
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power grids. Therefore, California and this limited group of States mandated 
investor-owned utilities provide “open access,” a policy that forced these 
utilities to make transportation available to independent generators at price 
and service levels equal to those provided to their own generators.14  
Specifically for interstate transactions, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) issued Order 888 in 1996 to establish “functional 
unbundling,” which encouraged utilities to separately manage transmissions 
and avoid discriminating among generators.15 However, vertically integrated 
utilities possess both the incentive and ability to circumvent 
nondiscrimination rules.16 Obeying the nondiscrimination rules conflicts with 
the incumbent utilities’ self-interests. In addition, regulators generally find it 
hard to detect discriminatory conduct.  
(b) The Success of “Operational Unbundling” 
To eliminate the propensity to discriminate, regulators must dissolve 
vertical integration of utilities. New England and California are at the 
forefront of the movement to pressure utilities to transfer the management of 
their transmission operations to regional transmission organizations (RTOs). 
On pace with this, the FERC issued Order 2000 in December 1999. Order 
2000 induces utilities to “operationally unbundle” their transmissions and 
establish RTOs.17 
The orders issued by both the FERC and State governments stopped short 
of mandating divestiture by simply encouraging utilities to vertically separate 
their transmissions. The FERC and States adopted this voluntary approach 
out of consideration for the investor-owned structure of utilities. Mandatory 
divestiture may give rise to issues relating to both property right infringement 
and constitutional “takings” under the Fifth Amendment, but a clear legal 
standard remains to be established. 
In many countries, investors own utility companies. These countries will 
 14. Commissioner Mozelle W. Thompson, Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission 
Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the Committee on Commerce, United States House 
of Representatives (May 6, 1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9905/electricpowertesti 
mony.pdf. 
 15. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Nondiscriminatory Services by 
Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 
888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (1996), clarified, 76 FERC ¶ 61,009 and 76 
FERC 61,347 (1996) [hereinafter Order 888], on reh’g, Order No. 888-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. 
¶ 31,048, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,274, clarified, 79 FERC ¶ 61,182 (1997), on reh’g, Order No. 888-B, 81 
FERC ¶ 61,248, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,688 (1977), on reh’g, Order No. 888-C, 82 FERC ¶ 61,046 (1998). 
 16. See OECD, supra note 9, at 178. 
 
 17. Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000, FERC Stats. & Regs. 31,089, on 
reh’g, Order 2000-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. 31,092. 
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face the same legal issues faced by regulators in the United States, namely 
the difficulty of divesting private utilities. However, if antitrust authorities 
can find persistent discriminatory behavior by these utilities, courts may feel 
compelled to divest them. However, regulators find it hard to identify 
discriminatory conduct in vertically integrated utilities, and these utilities can 
present a vast array of reasons (e.g. a need for an uninterrupted supply) to 
justify their discriminatory treatment. 
Regulators in the United States have been successful in vertically 
separating investor-owned utilities. The experiences in New England and 
California demonstrate to regulators in other countries that they can divest 
private utilities operationally by using their regulatory powers wisely. Facing 
numerous regulatory constraints, many utilities in the United States may have 
convinced themselves that a voluntary separation of transmissions serves 
their long-term interests. California’s method of bundling the establishment 
of RTOs with payments for stranded costs proved particularly effective.18  
3. Japan: The Slow Pace of Regulatory Reform 
Like utilities in the United States, Japanese electric companies are 
investor-owned. However, unlike the United States, the Japanese government 
has neither mandated nor induced utilities to operationally separate 
transmissions. The Japanese government has limited regulatory reform in the 
electricity sector to deregulation of electricity generation and the limited 
liberalization of entries into retailing. Japan should learn from the experience 
of the United States: competition in retailing will not gain momentum 
without the operational separation of transmissions. Far from achieving 
operational separation, Japan has not even managed to achieve functional 
separation of transmissions. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
(METI) (formerly the Ministry of International Trade and Industry) possesses 
the authority to intervene into the conduct of utilities but has never exercised 
it.  
In August 2000, the Japanese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC), the 
governmental agency responsible for enforcing Japanese antitrust law, 
requested that the Tokyo Power Company improve its pricing for newly 
entering electricity retailers. The JFTC was concerned with potentially 
unfavorable treatment by the Tokyo Power Company toward new market 
entrants in comparison to its established retailer base.19 The JFTC is going to 
find it hard to formally identify illegal discrimination because utilities can 
 18. A.B. 1890, 1996 Leg., 1996 Sess. (Cal. 1996). 
 
 19. See NIPPON KEIZAI SHINBUN [JAPAN ECON. J.], Aug. 11, 2000, at 3. 
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justify their discriminatory conduct with a limitless variety of seemingly 
valid but unverifiable reasons. 
METI’s failure to strive for full liberalization of electricity retailing 
remains a major limitation to Japanese electricity regulatory reform. In 2000, 
METI only planned to liberalize for customers whose consumption exceeded 
twenty thousand volts while gradually reducing the voltage floor.20  
One cannot find any reason why regulators should introduce retail 
competition gradually. Inertia and switching costs naturally inhibit small-
scale consumers from changing electricity suppliers. Under the pretext of 
avoiding radical changes, the Japanese Ministry of Finance made gradualism 
a marked feature of financial reform. However, gradualism slowed industry 
restructuring, eventually necessitating adoption of the “Big Bang” approach. 
The role of regulatory authority should be to enhance competition and not to 
slow down its acceleration. 
Japanese electric companies have opposed swift liberalization, citing the 
need to preserve investments in nuclear technology. However, nuclear plants 
worldwide have lost cost competitiveness while simultaneously losing public 
support due to the concern over nuclear accidents and the dangers of nuclear 
waste. 
Incumbent monopolists naturally dislike competition, and regulatory 
authorities should pressure them to be more tolerant of competition rather 
than sympathizing with their reluctance to accept it. The timidity of the 
Japanese electricity authority, the Natural Resources and Energy Agency, 
may be because it is situated within METI, which is responsible for both 
Japanese industrial policy and regulation. Industrial policy objectives and 
regulatory objectives should not coexist in one government agency because 
of their contradictory nature.21 The Natural Resources and Energy Agency 
involves itself with industrial policy in the energy sector; thus, its officials 
tend to identify their interests with the interests of electricity companies. In 
fact, many such officials find their second careers in energy or electric 
companies.  
The Japanese experience demonstrates the need for creating independent 
regulatory agencies outside ministries in charge of industrial policies. Such 
an organizational structure would force the regulatory agency to concentrate 
on promoting competition rather than leading the private sector. 
 20. MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, TRADE AND INDUSTRY, TSUSHO HAKUSHO [WHITE PAPER ON 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: JAPAN] 141 (2000). 
 21. See OECD, REGULATORY REFORM IN JAPAN 107 (1999). 
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B. The Telecommunications Sector: Diversified Approaches Among 
Advanced Countries 
In contrast to the electricity sector, where a clear trend toward vertical 
separation exists, telecommunications regulators in advanced countries 
exhibit diverse attitudes toward vertical separation. This part compares the 
different approaches of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, 
and then evaluates the policy of vertically separating dominant 
telecommunications companies.  
Vertical separation is more problematic in the telecommunications sector 
than in the electricity sector because telecommunications technology, 
particularly the packet-switched system, has blurred the boundary of the 
natural monopoly.22 On the other hand, the local loop (particularly the 
section known as “the last mile”) remains as the core of a natural monopoly 
in nearly every country.23 
1. United States: Vertical Divestiture in Accordance with Antitrust 
Principles 
(a) The 1984 Divestiture of AT&T and the 1996 
Telecommunications Act 
In 1984, following the landmark decision in United States v. American 
Tel. & Tel. Co.,24 the U.S. Government in effect vertically separated the U.S. 
telecommunications industry when it divested AT&T of the regional Bell 
Operating Companies (BOCs), which were the twenty-two AT&T 
subsidiaries engaged in the business of providing local phone service. Ever 
since the divestiture, the U.S. Government has prohibited the BOCs from 
providing interstate telecommunications services. The rationale behind the 
district court’s decision and the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) prosecution to 
divest AT&T consisted of the following: (1) a vertically integrated 
monopolist (AT&T) possessed incentives to forestall entries into potentially 
competitive interstate telecommunications markets; (2) AT&T actually 
engaged in anticompetitive exclusionary conducts; and (3) the FCC could not 
detect AT&T’s subtle forms of vertical foreclosure. 
The vertical divestiture of AT&T, combined with horizontal divestitures, 
 22. See NEWBERY, supra note 13, at 190. 
 23. “The last mile” or “the last one mile” refers to the last portion of the local loop, namely the 
space between the central switch and office buildings or homes.  
 24. 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982). 
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clearly was successful, as the U.S. telecommunications sector consistently 
has achieved the best performance (primarily rapid cost reductions and 
innovations) among advanced countries. Nevertheless, the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 allowed BOCs to enter long-distance 
(interstate) telecommunications markets. However, the Telecommunications 
Act retained the district court’s reasoning: BOCs are permitted to enter into 
long-distance interstate telecommunications only after fulfilling rigorous 
conditions that avoid a recurrence of vertical foreclosures.  
(b) Unnecessary Complexities in U.S. Regulations of Local 
Telecommunications 
As regulators separate bottlenecked local loops, U.S. telecom regulation 
maintains the potential to become light-handed. First, regulators should 
liberalize potentially competitive long-distance markets and leave their 
surveillance to enforcers of the antitrust laws. FCC regulation has followed 
this course: the FCC found AT&T to be non-dominant in 1995 and 
subsequently deregulated U.S. long-distance markets. Second, regulation of 
local telecommunications should be simplified, as independent BOCs 
possess no incentive to discriminate against long-distance carriers. Currently, 
FCC rules regulating local telecommunications are complex and have been 
contested in numerous courts.25 
Although local telecommunications carriers are not vertically integrated, 
they do possess power in local markets and their rates therefore should be 
regulated. The ideal method would be for regulators to replace traditional 
rate-of-return regulation with price caps. Rate-of-return regulation only 
perpetuates the inefficiency of monopolists while price caps simulate 
competitive markets, thereby inducing monopolists to decrease costs. These 
reasons are what prompted regulators in the United Kingdom and United 
States to adopt price caps. 
Price rate regulation of local BOCs is necessary for both consumer rates 
and access pricing for long-distance companies. Current FCC and State 
regulation of consumer rates and access pricing currently are unnecessarily 
complicated and anticompetitive due primarily to universal service 
considerations. “Universal service” in the United States and many other 
countries refers to the assurance of “affordable prices” for all citizens.26 
 25. The most important case thus far is the U.S. Supreme Court decision AT&T Corp. v. Iowa 
Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366 (1999). 
 26. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, indicating “universal service principles,” stresses that 
“[q]uality services should be available at just, reasonable, and affordable rates.” 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(1) 
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Many have interpreted the phrase “affordable prices” as assuring the same 
prices to people living in high-cost areas as those living in low-cost areas. 
Therefore, universal service has necessitated cross-subsidization between 
high-cost areas (primarily rural areas) and low-cost areas (primarily 
metropolitan areas), and between local markets and long-distance markets. 
Universal service realized by cross-subsidization is anticompetitive, as 
prices departing from costs distort competition. Governments should 
accomplish universal service when politics necessitate it, by direct use of 
their budgets.27 A universal fund system, by which all carriers contribute the 
funds necessary for universal service alleviates the anticompetitive nature of 
universal service, but it cannot eliminate the anticompetitive effects.28 The 
anticompetitive and anti-deregulatory effects of universal service permeate a 
large majority of advanced countries. In addition, by including the 
unbundling obligation and long-run incremental cost-based (LRIC) 
interconnection pricing toward local BOCs, the Telecommunications Act of 
1996 added two regulatory concepts that unnecessarily complicate the 
regulation of local telecommunications. 
The unbundling obligation and LRIC pricing are the focus of much 
controversy and litigation. Economists’ criticisms against unbundling and 
LRIC pricing are particularly convincing.29 Current straightjacket regulations 
of local competition in the United States are anticompetitive and anti-
deregulatory. Regulators should apply antitrust concepts like the essential 
facility doctrine and price caps30 to local competition to achieve simplified 
and pro-competitive regulations. 
(1996). The Telecommunications Act goes on to generally describe “universal service” as “an 
evolving level of telecommunications services that the Commission shall establish periodically under 
this section, taking into account advances in telecommunications and information technologies and 
services.” Id. § 254(c)(1). 
 27. In the U.S. electricity sector, cross-subsidies seem much less important, as subsidies to rural 
areas generally have come in the form of explicit capital subsidies. R.W. CRANDALL, MANAGED 
COMPETITION IN U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS 10 (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, 
Working Paper 99-1, 1999), available at http://www.aei.brookings.org. 
 28. See Press Release, Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth, Press Statement of Commissioner 
Furchtgott-Roth Regarding FCC’s October 21 Universal Service Orders (Oct. 21, 1999), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Furchtgott_Roth/Statements/sthfr953.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2002). 
 29. See JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 148-
49 (2000). 
 30. The 1999 access-pricing rule adopted price caps for access pricing. See FED. COMM. 
COMM’N, FIFTH REPORT AND ORDER AND FURTHER NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING, FCC 99-206 
(1999), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Orders/1999/fcc99206.txt (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2002) (adopting price caps for access pricing). Interconnection pricing for local 
competition should adopt price caps because it is logically inconsistent to differentiate interconnection 
pricing from access pricing. 
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2. United Kingdom: Failure to Vertically Divest at the Time of 
Privatization 
While privatizing its state-owned telecom entity, the British government 
contemplated following the United States in its method of breaking up 
monopolists. However, to facilitate sales of stock in the newly privatized 
British Telecom, the government maintained the monopolist’s vertically 
integrated structure. After the British government abolished the duopoly 
policy in 1991, thereby allowing free entries into the market, competition and 
performance improved in the British telecommunications sector. However, 
British Telecom still maintains monopolistic positions in both local and long-
distance markets. 
Electricity regulations worldwide and telecom regulations in the United 
States have proven the difficulty of detecting the discriminatory behavior of 
vertically integrated monopolists. It therefore is likely that the British 
regulatory authority, the Office of Telecommunications (OFTEL), 
encountered similar difficulties in identifying the anticompetitive practices of 
British Telecom.  
Several commentators have pointed out the effectiveness of the 
accounting separation OFTEL imposed on British Telecom in 1995.31 
However, local loops and long-distance lines jointly bear a large portion of 
telecommunications costs which, according to economists, cannot be 
allocated properly.32 Accounting separation fails to eliminate incentives for 
integrated monopolists to favor their own operators, making it doubtful that 
OFTEL can monitor British Telecom’s anticompetitive foreclosures 
effectively. 
3. Japan: Adoption of a Halfway Measure—Transforming Nippon 
Telegraph and Telephone into a Holding Company 
In 1985, the Japanese Government privatized the Telecom Public 
Corporation, giving birth to the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone 
Corporation (NTT). Privatization of NTT, however, is not yet complete. The 
Japanese government still owns 59% of NTT stock, and the NTT Act 
obligates the government to possess at least one-third of NTT stock.33 Japan 
has deregulated entries into telecommunications markets gradually, thus 
 31. See NEWBERY, supra note 13, at 327. 
 32. See CRANDALL, supra note 27, at 13. 
 33. See NIPPON DENSHIN DENWA KABUSHIKIGAISHA HŌ [NIPPON TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE 
COMPANY ACT], Law No. 85 of 1984, art. 4.  
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allowing several new entrants into the long-distance market. These “new 
common carriers” (NCCs) increased their market shares, thereby stimulating 
a greater level of effective market competition. In contrast, local 
telecommunications markets have allowed only small-scale entrants into the 
Tokyo metropolitan area. NTT still maintains a virtual nationwide monopoly.  
The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), the governing 
body in charge of regulating Japanese telecommunications has contemplated 
divesting NTT in order to realize a more effective level of competition. In 
1990, the Telecommunications Council, an advisory committee to the 
Minister, recommended divesting NTT into three separate companies. 
However, NTT successfully opposed the divestiture through the exertion of 
considerable political influence through its giant labor union.  
The MPT and NTT reached a political compromise in 1996, under which 
NTT agreed to restructure itself into a holding company. Under the parent 
holding company, two local telecommunications subsidiaries (NTT East and 
NTT West), one long-distance company (NTT Communications), one 
cellular company (NTT Docomo), and several other subsidiaries all coexist.  
The MPT publicized the NTT reorganization as a “separation of NTT.”34 
However, this terminology is erroneous, as the parent company still holds 
100% of the stock in NTT East, NTT West, and NTT Communications.35 
With complete stock ownership, the NTT holding company can manage 
itself as one entity. A holding company merely constitutes another corporate 
form for management of a multidivisional organization. NTT itself 
proclaimed that the NTT holding company will be “managed as one group” 
and aims to “develop as one group.”36 
Without regulation by the MPT, NTT can manage the holding company 
as one entity, just as other prominent holding companies (e.g., Citicorp) have 
been managed. The MPT has contemplated adopting measures restraining 
NTT with a view toward “securing fair competition.”37 However, if the MPT 
 34. For instance, the Telecommunications Council (a governmental deliberation council under 
the auspices of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications) reported that the reorganization of 
NTT realized a separation between the local telecommunication sector with its bottleneck facility and 
competitive sectors such as long-distance telecommunications. See Telecommunications Council of 
Japan, Report on IT Revolution and Competition Policy § 3(2) (Nov. 16, 2000), available at 
http://www.soumu.go.jp/joho_tsusin/pressrelease/japanese/denki/001116j601.html.  
 35. Parent NTT holds 67% of the outstanding stock of NTT Docomo. Nippon Telegraph and 
Telephone, Consolidated Subsidiaries Annual Report 2000, available at http://www.ntt.co.jp/ir/ 
reports. Other stocks are held by individual and corporate stockholders. Id. 
 36. NIPPON TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE, NTT NO SAIHENSEI NITUITE [ON THE 
REORGANIZATION OF NTT] (May 29, 1998) (on file with author). 
 
 37. See Press Release, Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, Public Opinions on NTT 
Reorganization and MPT’s Responses (Apr. 23, 1999), available at http://www.soumu.go.jp/joho_ 
tsusin/pressrelease/japanese/denki/990423j601.html. According to the MPT, “fair competition” means 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p301 Takigawa2 book pages.doc  10/15/02   11:41 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
316   WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 1:301 
 
 
 
 
 
forces NTT to allow its subsidiaries to operate independently, it would 
compromise the current holding company structure in which the parent holds 
100% of the stock in its subsidiaries. In April 1999, the MPT announced that 
it would allow NTT subsidiaries to possess interlocking executives, 
reasoning that they are a normal feature of holding companies.38 The MPT 
left other restraints ambiguous, planning to elaborate on them when it 
deemed necessary. 
With the current holding company structure, the MPT can impose only 
facial restraints on NTT’s management because the wholly owned 
subsidiaries could not act independently even if they wanted to. The holding 
company structure cannot function if there is a separation of management. 
Achieving management separation requires a complete legal separation of 
corporate ownership that would require NTT to give up its stock holdings in 
all of its subsidiaries.  
Forcing NTT to give up its stock holdings in NTT Docomo would be the 
most effective way to introduce competition into local Japanese 
telecommunications markets. Cellular service in Japan has shown 
phenomenal growth: more than 40% of the population now uses cellular 
telephones. As more fixed telephone users switch to cellular telephones, it is 
likely that customers of NTT East, NTT West, and NTT Communications 
will shift to NTT Docomo. This shift then could lead to an internal conflict 
within the NTT holding company. In order to secure its competitive base, 
NTT Docomo should strive to achieve formative independence outside the 
NTT holding company structure. 
Although the Japanese government owns 59% of NTT stock, individual 
stockholders exist. Such a large percentage of individual stockholders likely 
means that many will oppose a breakup of NTT in order to protect investor 
interests. However, Japan could break up NTT without harming investors 
because NTT is not purely a private company. NTT remains partly public 
due to the NTT Act of 1984, which placed NTT under MPT surveillance. 
The Japanese government could privatize NTT completely by selling all its 
stock holdings to the public while simultaneously abolishing the NTT Act. 
NTT companies then would gain liberation from government constraints and 
share value for the stockholders generally would increase. 
NTT’s divestiture would simplify access regulation against NTT. The 
newly independent NTT East and NTT West would be separated from the 
long-distance company, NTT Communications, and therefore would have no 
competition on equal footing between NTT and its competitors. 
 38. Id. 
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incentive to discriminate against other long-distance companies. The MPT 
established access rules for NTT, but ambiguity remains therein because the 
exact costs for local and long-distance elements of NTT operation cannot be 
calculated. The MPT announcement in 2000 that due to pressure from the 
United States it would reduce NTT’s access charge by 20% shows this 
ambiguity. The MPT did not amend the existing access pricing rule, which 
proves that access pricing rules always operate arbitrarily for vertically 
integrated firms. The MPT likely cannot eliminate this arbitrariness even 
after the adoption of LRIC access pricing rules.  
4.  Divestiture or Access Regulation:Which is Better? 
The above comparison of vertical divestitures and access rules 
demonstrates the merits of vertical divestitures of integrated monopolies. At 
a minimum, for the electricity and telecommunications sectors, the regulatory 
benefits of vertical divestiture outweigh possible losses in an economy of 
scope. With regard to the objection regarding investors’ rights, methods exist 
to accomplish vertical divestiture without harming their rights. The 
experiences of the U.S. electric and Japanese telecommunications industries 
illustrate this point. 
Following the vertical divestiture of utilities, innovation will weaken the 
naturally monopolistic nature of bottlenecks gradually while simultaneously 
blurring the boundaries between natural monopoly and competitive elements. 
Such developments ultimately may lead to a reintegration of vertically 
separated utilities, a topic thoroughly discussed in Part IV. 
IV. REGULATION OF REINTEGRATION 
Following vertical divestitures, utilities often will seek reintegration into 
upstream or downstream markets through either vertical mergers or new 
investments. Regulators initially should seek to prohibit them from 
reintegrating; however, if market conditions change significantly after the 
divestiture, regulators should consider allowing the reintegration. Regulators 
should make the decision on whether to allow reintegration by balancing the 
economic efficiency expected from reintegration against the risk of 
competition distortion. Regulators should put more weight on the latter, as 
countries’ experiences indicate that a loss of competition gives rise to 
tremendous economic inefficiency.  
If regulators could invent effective safeguards to prevent abuses of market 
power, they could achieve the desired economic efficiency from vertical 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p301 Takigawa2 book pages.doc  10/15/02   11:41 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
318   WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 1:301 
 
 
 
 
 
integration without engendering market power issues. However, effective 
safeguards are difficult to realize. 
A. Reintegration in the Electricity Sector: The Need for Prohibition 
In the electricity sector, the natural monopoly of power grids is well 
established. The boundary between natural monopoly and competitive 
elements (i.e. electricity generation and retailing) is clearly demarcated. It is 
for this reason that regulators should prohibit transmission companies from 
reintegrating into generation or retailing. It is only after new technology 
eliminates the market power of transmission companies that regulators 
should allow this reintegration. 39 
Regulators in the United Kingdom faced this issue as two electricity 
generation companies (PowerGen and National Power) made bids to acquire 
distribution companies. The Monopoly and Merger Commission (MMC) 
found the mergers to be against the public interest. The MMC nevertheless 
recommended that the mergers proceed, albeit under certain conditions. 
However, the Minister of Trade and Industry rejected the bids in 1996, 
discarding the MMC’s recommendation.40 The Minister possessed a better 
grasp of the industry, as regulators cannot check the market power of the 
reintegrated company effectively through the regulatory safeguards. Richard 
Green and David Newbery point out that vertical integration would increase 
the difficulty of regulating such discriminatory contracts.41 
B. Reintegration in the Telecommunications Sector: The Prohibition or 
Safeguard Approach? 
The telecommunications sector has experienced more rapid technological 
developments and market transformations than the electricity sector. In 
response, telecom regulators may show more flexibility toward reintegration 
than electricity regulators. However, an important question remains: How 
much more flexibility can the telecom regulators have? 
Regulators in the United States encountered this issue when a court 
entered a consent decree prohibiting divested BOCs from entering 
competitive portions of telecommunications markets. However, the FCC has 
mitigated this restriction by allowing BOCs to enter select competitive 
 39. In the near future, it is likely that new technology such as solar cells will eliminate the need 
for power grids. See The Dawn of Micropower, ECONOMIST, Aug. 5, 2000, at 75. 
 40. See NEWBERY, supra note 13, at 231-32. 
 
 41. See Richard Green & David M. Newbery, The Electricity Industry in England and Wales, in 
COMPETITION IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES 102 (Dieter Helm & Tim Jenkinson eds., 1998). 
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sectors of the telecommunications industry such as cellular services and 
electronic publishing. 
The FCC imposed safeguards on BOCs, like accounting safeguards and 
separate subsidiary requirements, which have proven effective thus far. Few 
have raised complaints regarding abusive behavior of BOCs, and BOC 
market shares in newly entered fields have remained relatively static. 
However, regulators have allowed BOCs to enter only markets of minor 
importance. Real challenges will occur when BOCs reenter the interstate 
telecommunications market.  
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 established rigorous conditions 
regarding the entry of BOCs into the interstate telecommunications market. 
These conditions preserve the spirit of the AT&T divestiture, for a BOC 
cannot enter into the interstate market until there are enough entrants into the 
local markets in which the respective BOC operates. So far, the FCC and 
DOJ have approved only the entry of a few BOCs’ into the interstate market, 
which illustrates that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides the FCC 
with considerable discretion. The FCC and DOJ should take care not to rely 
too heavily on instituted safeguards. Experiences in advanced countries’ 
electric and telecommunications industries demonstrate that vertically 
integrated monopolists possess strong incentives to cross-subsidize and that 
safeguards cannot block subtle discrimination by integrated monopolists 
effectively. 
The FCC pointed out the salutary effect of price caps in reducing 
monopolists’ incentives to engage in cross-subsidization, but this has little 
effect on monopolists because they can ignore short-term profit loss and 
continue harassing competitors.42 In allowing the merger between a BOC 
(Bell Atlantic) and a medium-scale vertically integrated company (GTE), the 
FCC stressed the effectiveness of safeguards against the market power of the 
merged company.43 However, the FCC admits that it cannot “foresee every 
possible type of discrimination, especially with evolving technologies”44 and 
“hard-to-detect methods of non-price discrimination.”45 The FCC 
 42. See MARIUS SCHWARTZ, THE ECONOMIC LOGIC FOR CONDITIONING BELL ENTRY INTO 
LONG DISTANCE ON THE PRIOR OPENING OF LOCAL MARKETS (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for 
Regulatory Studies, Working Paper 00-04, 2000), available at http://www.aei.brookings.org/ 
publications/working/working_00_04.pdf (pointing out that the effects of the price cap have been 
overstated). 
 43. See FED. COMM. COMM’N, GTE CORPORATION AND BELL ATLANTIC CORPORATION, FCC 
00-221, para. 198 (2000). 
 44. Id. para. 179. 
 45. Id. para. 192. 
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contradicted its own ideology and policy by allowing the merger between 
Bell Atlantic and GTE.  
V. CONCLUSION 
By analyzing the electricity and telecommunications sectors in the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Japan in detail, this Article illustrates the 
desirability of separating natural monopoly elements from potentially 
competitive elements. At least for the electricity and telecommunications 
sectors, the regulatory benefits of vertical divestiture outweigh any possible 
losses in an economy of vertical coordination. Even in the 
telecommunications sector, the merits of vertical separation, on the whole, 
overwhelm any potential losses in an economy of scope. This 
recommendation considers the proven difficulty of detecting discriminatory 
conduct within vertically integrated monopolists. For investor-owned 
utilities, governments, by wisely using their regulatory powers, can realize 
divestitures without harming investors’ interests. 
Additional recommendations: 
Governments should establish regulatory agencies that exist and operate 
independently from ministries in charge of industrial policies. The 
coexistence of industrial policy and regulation in one agency obstructs 
regulators from concentrating on pro-competitive regulations. 
Regulators should strive for simple regulatory structures. Complicated 
regulatory oversight rarely succeeds. Utility regulations have become 
unnecessarily complicated and anticompetitive due primarily to universal 
service considerations.  
If the government finds universal service to be politically necessary, the 
government should provide support in the form of direct government 
funding. Universal service realized by cross-subsidization generates an 
anticompetitive market structure and excessively complicated regulations. 
Unbundling and LRIC pricing in telecommunications created 
unnecessarily complex regulations. Regulators should apply antitrust 
standards and price caps to telecommunications markets to achieve 
simplified and pro-competitive regulations. 
The adoption of a holding company structure cannot supplant vertical 
divestiture of utilities. A holding company is merely another corporate form 
for managing a multidivisional organization. With 100% of the subsidiary’s 
stock in its possession, a holding company can suppress the independent 
conduct of subsidiaries easily, allowing it to manage the entire holding 
company as one entity.  
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Safeguards like accounting separation and price caps cannot effectively 
reduce monopolists’ incentives to engage in anticompetitive conduct such as 
cross-subsidization. The establishment of safeguards is generally an 
inadequate substitute for the vertical divestiture of utilities. 
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